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Abstract
We investigate the problem of classifying a line of program
as containing a vulnerability or not using machine learning.
Such a line-level classification task calls for a program rep-
resentation which goes beyond reasoning from the tokens
present in the line. We seek a distributed representation in a
latent feature space which can capture the control and data
dependencies of tokens appearing on a line of program, while
also ensuring lines of similar meaning have similar features.
We present a neural architecture, Vulcan, that successfully
demonstrates both these requirements. It extracts contex-
tual information about tokens in a line and inputs them as
Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) paths to a bi-directional LSTM
with an attention mechanism. It concurrently represents the
meanings of tokens in a line by recursively embedding the
lines where they are most recently defined. In our experi-
ments, Vulcan compares favorably with a state-of-the-art
classifier, which requires significant preprocessing of pro-
grams, suggesting the utility of using deep learning to model
program dependence information.
1 Introduction
A recent direction of program analysis research infers prop-
erties of programs by learning statistical models of them
with “Big Code” architectures [20]. In one example, Deep-
Bugs develops an architecture to detect whether an entire
function is buggy [19]. Typically, a “BigCode" architecture
relies upon a corpus of programs and has two (or more)
neural networks in sequence. The code is preprocessed and
input to the first neural network where the network trans-
forms it, non-linearly, into a distributed representation using
weights that are trained using statistical machine learning. A
distributed representation refers to a latent space, in which
the features of programs have comparative value i.e. similar
program components have similar meaning and are close in
the space. Next, the distributed representation is passed to a
predictive network (model) that is trained with labels in a
supervised manner. A variety of applications are well served
by this approach including renaming poorly named variables
to meaningful ones [5], detecting clones [26], and more. See
Allamanis et al. [2] for a review on relevant literature.
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The choice of an appropriate distributed representation
of the corpus of programs is crucial to application success.
A popular choice preprocesses the code by tokenizing it
and presenting each line as a sequence of tokens as input
to the architecture’s first network which uses a recurrent
learning architecture. The survey of [2], Table 1 presents mul-
tiple such examples. Tokens are convenient to use, however
whether they are ideal is open to question. Programs have
rich structural and contextual information which tokeniza-
tion ignores. For example, a line of program x = foo(a)+b
has different meaning depending on where it appears in a
program, i.e. its context, and, the meaning of the statement
depends on the most recent definitions of its right hand
variables, and (recursively) on the most recent definitions
of these recent definitions. These properties are not explic-
itly captured by token sequences. It could be argued that
tokenization has traction largely because what it lacks in
program expressiveness is, to some extent, compensated for
by the power of the learning algorithm and non-linear capac-
ity of the LSTM or graph neural network. See [11, 27] for a
discussion on LSTMs capturing such dependencies in natural
language processing (NLP) tasks. Regardless, tokenization
also remains dependent on the application seeking a predic-
tive property of the entire unit of code, e.g. a function in the
case of DeepBugs, and not a single line.
In this contribution we seek a representation that serves
single line classification. We ask whether a representation
based on structural and contextual information is better than
tokenization and up to the task of accurate line-level classifi-
cation.
Our contribution is a novel neural architecture - Vulnera-
bility Classification Network (Vulcan), that we demonstrate
on the problem of vulnerability classification at the line level.
Vulcan takes a much more nuanced approach to forming a
distributed representation than tokenization. It extracts con-
textual information about tokens in a line and inputs them, as
Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) paths, to a bi-directional LSTM
with an attention mechanism. It concurrently represents the
meanings of tokens in a line by recursively embedding the
lines where they are most recently defined. It has multiple
“helper” networks that transform variable length inputs to
fixed lengths and sub-assembly steps performing concate-
nation. We experimentally evaluate Vulcan’s performance
and whether its distributed representation defines a latent
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feature space where lines of similar meaning have similar
features.
2 Representation Design
Our goal is a representation that will help us infer what a
line means so that it is possible to classify it containing a
vulnerability or not. The representation must capture the
definitions of the different tokens that appear in a line and
the context in which the line is executed. If a right hand
side token is a variable, the representation will have to chain
backward to retroactively include the meaning of the line
where that variable is defined, and the context of that defini-
tion,. e.g. whether it is within a loop or if statement. Here,
an update to a variable is also treated as a (re-)definition. For
machine learning purposes, we need a network architecture
that transforms the input representation of each line into a
continuous valued vector v of some fixed dimension, t . The
vectors of lines that are similar in meaning to each other
should be close to each other in the vector space. This allows
supervised machine learning models to pinpoint an accurate
discriminatory boundary between label (presence, absence
of vulnerability) classes during training.
Walking through a simple program snippet illustrates how
a line can be represented. The program snippet in Figure 1
Figure 1. An example code snippet. We show how different
tokens and their dependencies can be represented. Paths
comprising the nodes of a program AST represent both con-
trol and data information. Here, paths Pr ,Py connect the
usages of variables r and y on line L4 to their respective
updates on lines L2 and L3.
describes function foo. Variable r is updated in a loop, while
variable y is updated on line L3. Both are used in line L4. How
should we represent the meaning of L4: x = y/r? We know
that L4 updates variable x and the new value of x depends
on variables y,rwhich are operands of the division operator.
We need to represent this division expression and to do so
we need the values of y and r. What, at L4, are the values
of these variables? While these cannot be fully determined
through static analysis, it is possible to go back to the line
where each variable is most recently defined or updated, as
well as to identify its control context. We refer to this process
as retrieving the define and context information, respectively.
The simple example is backtracking to y, and finding its most
recent definition/update on L3. The assignment statement is
not surrounded by control context that would influence the
update of y, but we have one more detail to consider: the
right hand side of expressions which assign values to y and
r themselves have prior definitions and context. Thus, we
have to recursively represent these until we finally recurse
to the base case of their first definition, when we can express
that directly.
Themore involved example is backtracking r. It is updated
on L2where r’s assignment is in the control context of a loop.
In Section 4 we will use the AST of the program to extract
this context by capturing the path between the two lines, and
use a recursive algorithm to obtain a representation for the
entire line L2.
Because operators are predefined we simply directly en-
code them with an arbitrary fixed representation that differ-
entiates each from all others (a one-hot encoding).
Beyond this simple example, we need a way to encode
function calls. They are effectively operators. If L4 was in-
stead x = y/bar(r), for some function bar, we consider
two cases: (a) bar is an in-built library, or (b) bar is a user-
defined function. We treat calls to in-built libraries the way
we treat operators - directly encoding them with a represen-
tation. We treat user-defined functions as a variable whose
previous definition was the return statement in the function
call. Hence, for a line x = y/bar(r), we would, in all, encode
the values and contexts of four tokens: y, /, bar, and r.
Algorithm 1 sketches this recursive enumeration routine
to gather the (prior) definition and context of each token in a
line. It starts with an empty line representation and iterates
over the list of tokens to the right of the assignment oper-
ator. At each step of the recursion, it first locates the most
recent definition. It then concatenates the context between
the token and that location with a representation of that
location. In the Methods section (section 4), we follow up by
describing our network architecture and show, in three steps
using a staging of neural networks, how a line is transformed
starting from source code into v .
3 Related Work
We focus on works which use AST-based representations for
program reasoning within “Big Code” approaches. Bielik et
al. [5] correct improper variables names using probabilistic
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graphical models (PGM) of features that capture AST edge in-
formation. This contrasts with how Vulcan employs a neural
architecture to represent the AST edge information.
Both Hsiao et al. [7] and Srikant et al. [24] use program
dependence graphs to reason about code-clone detection
and bug finding, or automated assessments, respectively.
However, they represent their entire programs as counts
of edge information in the dependence graphs. They then
buildn-grammodels based on these counts. Ourwork instead
builds a distributed representation for such edge information
in dependency graphs. Given its simplicity and effectiveness,
however, we employ their approach as a baseline model in
our work.
Alon et al [4] introduce the notion of paths - a data struc-
ture to capture the dependencies between different occur-
rences of a variable appearing in a program. They show this
to be a generic representation suitable to model a variety of
downstream tasks. We use this notion of paths as a building
block in a larger representation scheme.
Allamanis et al [3] suggest using AST edge information in
the graph networks they use to model programs. We capture
the same inductive bias as that of a graph network, although
we use a bi-LSTM over edges in program dependence graphs
we extract. Moreover, we provide a hierarchical means of
producing token-level and line-level representations, each
building on the previous.
Some recent works have focused on detecting and classi-
fying vulnerabilities through traditional program analysis
techniques [17, 23, 28]. They use static analysis and fuzzing
to detect vulnerabilities. In works employing machine learn-
ing, VulDeePecker [10], DeepBugs [19], and Russell et al.
[21] are closest to the design we propose. We discuss them
in detail.
VulDeePecker.VulDeePecker employs a bi-directional LSTM
tomodel what they refer to as code gadgets. Each gadget starts
with a line containing manually-identified constructs (like
function and API calls) and lines containing variables which
depend on these constructs, resulting in a set of lines of code
governing the construct. Each code gadget has an associated
label which the LSTM learns. A vector representation of a
gadget is obtained by considering lexicalized tokens present
in them, thus treating it as a paragraph containing strings of
tokens. The main advantage of Vulcan over VulDeePecker is
that it does not require elaborate gadgets to be designed. Vul-
can extracts simple AST paths without any pre-processing
that requires extracting slices over program dependence
graphs. In follow-up work recently published on arXiv [9],
they address two key limitations in VulDeePecker, namely,
preparing gadgets for manually-identified constructs and not
accounting for control dependencies. Their revised approach
however again relies on an elaborate pre-processing step to
identify gadget like code-blocks of interest, something which
our approach does not need.
Russell et al. This work deals with C and C++ programs.
They too use static analyzers to obtain their ground truth
labels. However, they train a CNN on a bag of lexicalized
tokens and then use a Random Forest classifier to predict
whether an entire function contains a vulnerability or not.
Our work instead focuses on line meaning. The features
which our model learns contain control and data flow infor-
mation between variables, a much richer set of features as
compared to lexicalized tokens. We present models learned
on a bag of tokens as a baseline to compare our model’s
performance against.
DeepBugs. The representation used in this work to detect
bugs is token-level embeddings. These embeddings push
tokens within a similar context close to each other in the
chosen vector space. The work does not capture any de-
pendency based information in an overt way through its
underlying program graphs in any systematic way. Further,
we were motivated to develop a method for a relatively low-
resource setting, and hence chose to work with Solidity, a
fairly recent programming language, where the number of
usable scripts was in the order of 500K. DeepBugs trains on
an order of a million samples. The architecture we propose
does not require the magnitude of training data needed to
learn unsupervised token embeddings.
4 Method
We describe our neural network architecture in this section.
It consists of three stages. Its post-training input is the line
being assigned a value, and its output is a distributed rep-
resentation for the line, which is used to predict a label for
the line. When in training mode, this line is accompanied by
a label. We provide dimensions for intermediate and final
outputs of the architecture in Figure 2. This architecture is
sketched in Algorithm 1.
Stage 1. The input to Stage 1 is a tokenized line of code
in a program and the corresponding abstract syntax tree
(AST) [1] of the entire program. This stage retrieves tokens
from the input line and prepares a representation for each
one. Tokens here are variable names, function names, and
operators.
Any operators or calls to library functions are represented
with one-hot encoding over the space of such tokens seen
in the training set. An UNK is used to handle out of sample
tokens. User-defined functions are treated as variables, and
are dealt with as described below.
A variable requires a pair of representations - define and
context. For the first, we backtrack to identify the line of its
most recent definition. We refer to this line as the variable’s
end-point. We retrieve the end-point’s recursively computed
define representation. This is added to a list of define repre-
sentations which is saved for later use in Stage 3. Hence, for
each variable on the line of interest, we obtain a correspond-
ing define representation. For the context representation, our
3
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Figure 2. Overview of Vulcan. It uses the example of Figure 1. The inputs are the line of interest, i.e. L4, and the AST of the
program. A representation for L4 is computed, which is used by a classifier to predict whether that line has a vulnerability. In
Stage 1, we backtrack to the line where a variable used on the current line was most recently defined. In Figure 1, variables
y and r were updated at L2 and L3. The path from the AST, expressing context in terms of control and data dependencies
between line of interest and the most recent definition line, is then extracted. Each path, a sequence of length s , is then passed,
one at a time, to a bidirectional LSTM with dot-product attention to obtain its continuous-valued representation of dimension
q. These intermediate context representations are notated as RC (·). In Stage 2 context representations RC (·) of all tokens are
concatenated and passed through a feed forward network FFN_A to obtain an intermediate representation (denoted in blue). In
Stage 3, the intermediate representation is concatenated with the define representations (notated as RD (·)) of all the variables,
and representations of operators. This concatenated vector is then transformed to a representation of dimension t using a feed
forward network FFN_B, which is the final representation for line L4, R(L4 ). See Algorithm 1 for details. This is then passed to
a classifier FFN_C to produce a binary value indicating presence of vulnerability
goal is to provide context with respect to the variable’s most
recent definition. We express the control flow that influences
the variable, and the context of operators where it is an
operand. For example, the loop enclosing the variable r in
L2 in Figure 1 which exerts a control dependency, and the
binary operator / on L4. Conveniently, these control and
context dependencies are expressed by the program’s AST
via the AST path between the variable and its end-point. For
example, in the snippet, for r in L2, we can use the path
Pr where, in addition to the explicit data dependency mod-
eled by the path when connecting to its usage in L4, the
nodes LOOP, BinOp come up in the path as well. No other
pre-processing or program slicing is needed to obtain this
information.
Stage 2. The context of this variable, now a (context) path,
is a variable length sequence of tokens. We next transform
each variable’s (context) path to a fixed length representation.
Because a path is a sequence, we resort to a recurrent neural
network for this transformation. We choose a bi-directional
LSTM network to handle the long range dependencies in the
sequence [8] (Network LSTM in Figure 2). The LSTM network
has a dot-product attention mechanism [12], as it has been
empirically shown to improve modeling of sequences.
We append the output of the LSTM to a list of the context
representations for line of interest. Once all context paths,
corresponding to each token on the line of interest, have
been transformed, we pass this list through a simple feed
forward model to obtain a single, fixed length representation
of all the contextual information related to the line of interest
(Network FFN_A in Figure 2).
Stage 3. The role of the next stage is to assemble the con-
stituents of the line of interest. They comprise one-hot en-
codings for the operators, the context representation (Stage 2)
and the list of define representations corresponding to end-
points of each of the variables. We use a feed forward neural
network to transform the aggregation into a final fixed length
representation (Network FFN_B in Figure 2). It is this final
representation of the line of interest we feed into a classifier
for our downstream inference task. See lines 14, 15, 22, 24 in
Algorithm 1 for how the line representations at end-points
(which are the define representations) are used to form the
final representation of line of interest.
Classifier Learning. Vulcan detects vulnerabilities on a
given line of a Solidity smart contract. The final line rep-
resentation produced by Stage 3 above is input to a feed-
forward network that predicts the label - vulnerability or not
(Network FFN_C, Figure 2). A cross-entropy loss between the
predicted and true label trains the parameters of the entire
architecture. Details on the dataset and the task setup are
provided in the following section.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm to obtain line representations. (FFN
is a Feed Forward Neural Network)
1: procedure RepresentLine(L, ast)
2: ▷ L: Line number of current line in program P
3: ▷ ast: AST object of program P
4: ▷ Returns a t-dim representation of L
5: ▷ Obtain RH tokens of expression on line L
6: tokens← RHS(L)
7: defn_rs, cntxt_rs← [ ], [ ]
8: for tok ∈ tokens do
9: (ep, pth)← GetPath(tok, L, ast)
10: ▷ Generate define representation (RD (·), Fig 2)
11: if pth ∈ ∅ then
12: defn_r← random(dim = t )
13: else
14: if ep ∈ ∅ then
15: defn_r← pth ▷ One-hot-code of tok
16: else
17: defn_r← RepresentLine(ep, ast)
18: defn_rs← [defn_rs defn_r]
19: ▷ Generate context representation (RC (·), Fig 2)
20: ▷ See Fig 2 for LSTM, FFN_A, FFN_B
21: cntxt_r← LSTM(pth)
22: cntxt_rs← [cntxt_rs cntxt_r]
23: ▷ Generate context representation ∀ tokens on L
24: cntxt_rs← FFN_A(cntxt_rs)
25: ▷ Variable-length line representation
26: line_rs← [defn_rs cntxt_rs]
27: ▷ Transform to fixed-length line representation
28: line_rs← FFN_B(line_rs)
29: return line_rs
1: procedure GetPath(tok, L, ast)
2: ▷ tok: Token on line L in program P
3: ▷ L: Line number of current line in program P
4: ▷ ast: AST object of program P
5: ▷ Returns ep, the end-point– line number of most recent
define of tok, and pth, path from ep to L
6: if tok ∈ operators OR tok ∈ built-in func then
7: ep← ∅
8: pth← one-hot-encoding(tok)
9: else
10: if t ∈ user-defined func then
11: ep← line with return in tok’sdefinition.
12: else
13: ep←
line where tok was last
defined. ∅ if no previous
definition exists.
14:
15: pth←
path in ast between token tok on
line L and line ep. ∅ if no previous
definition exists.
16: return ep, pth
5 Experimental Setup
5.1 Vulcan
We train Vulcan, a classifier to predict vulnerabilities in
Solidity programs. All our experiments are set up as binary
classification tasks.We employ a weighted cross-entropy loss
measure and sub-sample data from the training set to account
for the highly uneven distribution of labels (details provided
in the next subsection). For the attention mechanism, we
implement Luong et al.’s dot-product attention.[12] We im-
plemented all our models using PyTorch version 1.0. To
ensure that all batches are of the same size, we limit the
number of lines in a program to 128, number of variables
in a program to 16, and the length of each variable’s path
to 32. These numbers are manually selected after observing
their distribution on the train-set. The context and define
representation dimensions (q and t in Figure 2) are 256 and
128 respectively. We use Adagrad as our optimizer and ap-
ply batch normalization. A URL to our source code will be
released in the final draft of our work.
5.2 Dataset
We choose to work with Solidity because there are well
documented recent cases of vulnerabilities leading to sub-
stantial financial losses. Multiple tools exists for detecting
vulnerabilities in Solidity [13, 14, 16]. The most robust and
popular of these tools uses symbolic analysis, which uses a
SAT-solver to find erroneous program states [6]. However,
this technique scales poorly. It requires experts to encode
erroneous states and requires sophisticated software design
that explores simulations of different program states.
Solidity and Ethereum. Ethereum is a popular public, de-
centralized, distributed ledger. It maintains transparent and
immutable records which are programmable on the ledger.
These are called smart contracts. Smart contracts enable pro-
gram logic to be shared and executed by multiple parties.
They are written in Solidity, a nascent programming lan-
guage designed specifically for them. Solidity follows an
object-oriented paradigm, is statically typed, and compiles
to bytecode which can be executed on Ethereum’s Virtual
Machine (EVM).
Vulnerabilities in Solidity programs.We analyze three
vulnerabilities (a) Transaction order dependency (TOD) - these
arise because of race conditions in the EVM which generate
unreliable function call order, (b) State change after execution
(StateChange) - these arise when function calls to third-party
contracts hang, rendering all code written after the calls
dead. (c) Integer Overflows, Underflows (IntUnOv) - these
arise when the result of an arithmetic operation is larger
than the word-size assigned by EVM. See Luu et al. [13] for
examples of each of these vulnerabilities.
Dataset.We scraped publicly available Solidity programs
from https://etherscan.io. As of May 2018, we scraped 28, 052
verified source files - files verified by Etherscan to be source
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codes corresponding to their byte codes available on the
Ethereum blockchain. 25, 813 of themwere compilable. Among
these, we selected only those which had at least two trans-
actions recorded on Ethereum. This served as a proxy for
filtering contracts involved in genuine transactions. We were
left with 19, 023 files. In total, these files contained 69, 599
contracts, and a total of 487, 873 functions. We subsampled
from this set by removing outliers and duplicates, reducing
the total set to 194, 988 functions.
Labeling. Given the aim of this work is to evaluate a deep
learning approach to program representation and vulnera-
bility detection, we used Mythril [16], an open-source, sym-
bolic analysis based vulnerability detection tool for smart
contracts as a source of labels. Mythril provides line num-
bers of the vulnerabilities it detects. Lines not flagged by
Mythril are considered benign. Our dataset had a total of
573, 251 lines of code. Of these, 12, 523 (∼ 2.2%) were flagged
as vulnerabilites by Mythril. The distribution of the three
vulnerabilities StateChange, TOD, IntUnOv were 2750 (22%),
4830 (38%), and 4943 (40%) respectively. In our modeling
process, each line of with code within every function was
considered as an input to the model. A private correspon-
dence with the authors of Mythril suggested that the tool
has an error rate of close to 10-15%.
Error metrics. We use five error metrics to measure how
well our classifier does, the same used by [10] - False positive
rate (FPR = FPFP+TN ), False negative rate (FNR =
FN
TP+FN ), Recall
(R = TPTP+FN ), Precision (P=
TP
TP+FP ), and F1-score (
2×P×R
P+R ) to
evaluate how well our classifiers perform. Since we have
much fewer vulnerable samples than benign samples, we
want our classifier to be as precise as possible. Hence, what
is desirable is low FPR and FNR, while having high recall,
precision, and F1-scores.
6 Experiments & Results
We investigate Vulcan’s performance as a vulnerability clas-
sifier using the metrics described in Section 5.2, and un-
derstand its components’ contribution to its performance.
Specifically, we ask -
RQ1. Is Vulcan capable of detecting and flagging
vulnerabilities in lines of programs?
Per Table 1, Vulcan has an F1-score of 60% compared
to its closest and state-of-the-art approach Vuldeepecker,
for which we train a model we call VULD-DeepLrn. VULD-
DeepLrn has an F1-score of 51%. To obtain this comparison,
we did our best to implement the Vuldeepecker approach
as described in [9, 10] while applying the design to vulnera-
bilities in Solidity.1 We heuristically identified arithmetic
operations and function calls as key points, which the au-
thors define to be “hotspots" for vulnerabilities. From these
1We did not communicate with the authors.
points, slices are made to generate code gadgets which are de-
scribed by the authors as snippets of code which are inform
or depend on the variables that interact at key points. We
also observe that Vulcan’s precision is better by 15% when
compared to VULD-DeepLrn’s, whereas the recall of both
models is roughly equivalent.
Model F1 P R FPR FNR
Vulcan (This work) 60 (3) 59 60 2 40
VULD-DeepLrn 51 (2) 44 63 1 37
Tok-as-BOW 5 (0) 3 36 46 64
Only-AST-Nodes 18 (0) 10 70 22 29
Only-AST-Paths 30 (0) 61 20 0 80
VULD-LogRegr 23 (0) 17 35 1 65
Vulcan-NO_ENDPTS 52 (1) 45 60 3 40
Vulcan-PREV_LN 53 (3) 53 53 2 47
Vulcan-NO_ATTN 52 (2) 54 51 2 49
Table 1. Vulnerability classification of different models eval-
uated in our work. All values are percentages rounded to the
nearest integer. This is a binary classification task of classi-
fying whether a line has a vulnerability or not. The results
are an average of 5 independent runs each. P, R stand for
Precision and Recall respectively. For readability, we show
standard deviations in brackets (·) only for F1-scores.
We expected Vulcan and VULD-DeepLrn would perform
similarly. In principle, both approaches attempt to express
similar information in programs. The relatively superior per-
formance of Vulcan is likely due to a shortcoming in our
implementation of Vuldeepecker. This shortcoming is prone
to arising because of the complexity and heuristic judge-
ment Vuldeepecker demands. Our approach, in contrast,
requires far fewer design decisions. For instance, Vulcan
needs no manual effort to identify key points to compute
gadgets. Further, Vulcan uses AST paths while calculating
gadgets requires program slicing.Vulcan achieves as much as
Vuldeepecker while being a superior, seamless deep learning
solution.
Reasoning at the granularity of lines is demonstrably hard
- it demands a representation which accounts for the depen-
dence information of the constituent tokens. Per Table 1,
as expected, a naïve baseline of a bag of words of just the
tokens appearing in a line does not discriminate presence of
vulnerabilities (model Tok-as-BOW, F1-score of 5%). In Tok-
as-BOW, a dictionary of all the unique tokens appearing in
each line is populated and a count matrix is prepared, where
each row corresponds to a line of program and the columns
correspond to the set of unique tokens seen in the training
set.
We also note that both Vulcan and VULD-DeepLrn per-
form modestly on the task of vulnerability classification.
6
Dependency-Based Neural Representations for Classifying Lines of Programs ArXiv Preprint, March, 2020
There is significant room for improvement. There could be
several issues at play here. Two of the vulnerability classes
in our dataset exploit Ethereum’s complex, concurrent archi-
tecture. Their precise meaning is tricky to express. Further,
the dataset suffers from a class imbalance; just under two
percent of the dataset is labeled with a positive class. Be-
cause this imbalance should be expected of real-world data,
building models and techniques to deal with such settings is
an important direction of future work.
On that note, very recent contributions in NLP [15, 18]
have shown that despite high model performance, these mod-
els end up learning spurious correlations at best. This should
be a call to our community to design programming tasks
which truly can evaluate a machine’s ability to comprehend
them.
RQ2. What does each component of Vulcan con-
tribute to its performance?
Vulcan has two key components - context and define repre-
sentations. We investigate their respective contributions to
Vulcan’s ability to discriminate vulnerabilities. We proceed
by considering models that isolate representation proper-
ties and by ablating Vulcan. We also investigate whether
similar lines have similar line representations to lend confir-
mation that the architecture’s representation space respects
similarity.
Are context representations important? We would ide-
ally want to answer this question by ablating just the context
representations from the architecture (i.e. omitting cntxt_rs
in Algorithm 1). This is not possible in the current setup since
a token’s define representation is recursively dependent on a
line representation that is built from context representations.
Hence, ablating the context representation would affect de-
fine representations as well. We instead train two simple bag
of words classifiers using solely the context features to test
whether they are predictive of program information. First,
for a model named Only-AST-Nodes, we evaluate how much
just the AST nodes appearing in Vulcan’s paths, while ignor-
ing other information which the entire sequence of nodes
may provide, are predictive of the final task. We do this by
training a bag of words on the names of unique AST nodes
that appear in all of the variables’ context paths seen training.
Next, we train Only-AST-Paths, where we evaluate whether
the sequential ordering of the nodes appearing in the paths
adds additional value. We do this by learning a bag of words
on all the unique paths, where a path is a string of AST
nodes, of all the tokens seen in training. Only-AST-Nodes
and Only-AST-Paths have F1-scores of 18% and 30% respec-
tively. These two models suggest that AST node information
and the sequential properties of the paths are important to
the overall predictability.
In the spirit of Only-AST-Paths, we train model VULD-
LogRegr, where we learn a bag of words model using the
words extracted from all the gadgets of VulDeePecker seen
in training. This gives a sense of how informative the code
gadgets, which express a superset of the context paths, are by
themselves. VULD-LogRegr has an F1-score of 23% placing
its performance in between Only-AST-Nodes and Only-AST-
Paths. This ranking could relate to our gadget design choices.
Are define representations important?We perform two
ablations to our model to study whether the notion of end-
points and their corresponding define representations add
to the predictive ability of the model. First, we ablate the
contribution of define representations completely. We name
this model Vulcan-NO_ENDPTS. This corresponds to drop-
ping defn_rep from being included in line_rep on line 22
in Algorithm 1. We expect ablating this aspect of the model
to negatively affect the overall prediction since the model
is left with only the contextual information present in the
paths.
Second, we omit solely the end-points by selecting the
define representations of the previous line instead of rep-
resentations of the end-points of each token appearing on
a line of interest. We name this modified model as Vulcan-
PREV_LN. This corresponds to ep being assigned to L-1
(line preceding L) on lines 11 and 13 in function GetPath
in Algorithm 1. This is a tighter ablation as compared to
Vulcan-NO_ENDPTS which compares the effect of just the
end-point and its define representations.
Vulcan-NO_ENDPTS andVulcan-PREV_LN have F1 scores
of 52% and 53% respectively. This implies that the dependence
information Vulcan captures of tokens appearing on a line
of code accounts for a large part of its performance, as it
rightly should. Comparing Vulcan-NO_ENDPTS and Vul-
can-PREV_LN suggests that end-points are approximately as
informative as previous lines. This merits future investiga-
tion to confirm if this lack of difference is seen across other
tasks.
Overall, we find that the context and define representations
we present in this work are important and contribute to the
model’s overall prediction.
Is attention important?We also evaluate whether the dot-
product attention in Vulcan is effective. We name this ablated
model Vulcan-NO_ATTN. This model has an F1-score of 52%
versus Vulcan’s F1-score of 60%. This worse value is expected
because empirically, it has been shown that attention im-
proves accuracy across most model architectures [22, 25]. We
defer investigating the interpretability provided by attention
to future work.
How informative are line representations? In designing
Vulcan’s architecture, our goal is finding distributed line rep-
resentations that are similar for lines with similar contexts,
and dissimilar for those without. To experimentally evaluate
whether this is achieved, we set up the contexts of the tokens
appearing in the lines of interest to be vastly different, while
the lines themselves are identical. To proceed, we hand-craft
three categories of simple Solidity programs -
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Figure 3. How informative are line representations?We set up three categories of synthetic Solidity programs containing
50 programs each. Categories NO-MOD-DEP andMOD-DEP modify unique programs in category BASE in a controlled and
specific manner (details in Section 6). We compare the representations of specific lines of interest in programs from each of
these categories as computed by a trained Vulcan. We compare the average L2-distances of these representations among the
three categories (right). Larger values indicate the representations are farther apart.
1. BASE. In this category we set up unique programs, each
with a line of interest containing multiple tokens. One of
these tokens is defined to have an update in a specific context,
e.g. in a loop or within an if-branch, while arbitrary code can
exist between the line of interest and the line of update of
one of its tokens. For example, in Figure 3, the line of interest
is L2, where variable z is updated in a loop before L1.
2. MOD-DEP. To set up programs in this category we first
replicate the programs in BASE. Then each program is mod-
ified in a way which retains its overall structure but which
changes variables by renaming them in the line of inter-
est, operators by substitution and the quantity of arbitrary
code by insertion or deletion. For instance, in the program
inMOD-DEP in Figure 3, variables are renamed in the line
of interest, the choice of specific arithmetic operators on
the lines are changed, and the amount of arbitrary code (in
blocks 1, 2) varies.
3. NO-MOD-DEP. To set up programs in this category we
again first replicate the programs in BASE. Then each pro-
gram in NO-MOD-DEP is left to be identical to its counter-
part in BASE except that we modify the control context in
which the token is last updated. For example, in Figure 3,
the only difference is that variable z is not updated in a loop
anymore (line L1).
We seed category BASE with 20 unique programs, with
randomly inserted contexts and lines of interest. These then
have one corresponding modified program each in categories
MOD-DEP and NO-MOD-DEP. The lines of interest from
each of these 60 (20 × 3) programs are the inputs to Vul-
can after training. We extract line representations from our
trained Vulcan and compute the L2-distance between cor-
responding lines of corresponding programs across BASE,
MOD-DEP and NO-MOD-DEP. We tabulate the average L2-
distance across the data and we observe the distance between
programs in categories BASE vs. MOD-DEP, to be much
less than in categories BASE vs. NO-MOD-DEP, andMOD-
DEP vs. NO-MOD-DEP. Corresponding lines in programs in
BASE vs. NO-MOD-DEP and MOD-DEP vs. NO-MOD-DEP
should indeed have the farthest representations since the
contexts of the tokens appearing in the lines of interest are
vastly different, despite the lines themselves looking iden-
tical. Additionally, the difference between the averages of
BASE vs. NO-MOD-DEP and MOD-DEP vs. NO-MOD-DEP
is not significant, further suggesting that representations of
the lines of interest of programs in BASE and MOD-DEP
are similar. This shows that the representations our models
generates capture the contexts of the tokens appearing in it.
7 Conclusion and Future work
We introduce Vulcan, a novel neural architecture to con-
struct distributed representations for lines of programs. We
use these to classify whether a line of a Solidity program
has a vulnerability in it or not. We show that Vulcan com-
pares favorably with a state-of-the-art line-level classifier
but which involves significant pre-processing steps. Further,
we show, through ablations, that the different components
which make up our architecture contribute to the model’s
performance and are necessary. We also show experimen-
tally that Vulcan generates similar representations for lines
of similar meaning. Our work opens up interesting areas of
future work, where we can compare this architecture with
other modeling approaches like graph neural networks and
compare their performance on different applications.We also
provide one possible answer to the larger question of what
the right representation ought to be when reasoning about
programs statistically. Understanding these alternatives will
lead us to truly leverage and scale a data-driven approach to
analyzing and generating programs.
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